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Campaign finance reform has been a central topic of public and political debate 
for the last five years. The purpose of this paper is to understand three separate 
perspectives on this issue. First, the judicial perspective is outlined to understand 
what sorts of arguments and debates the Supreme Court is dealing with in ruling 
on essential cases such as Citizens United v. F.E.C. Secondly, the issue of 
campaign finance is analyzed as an issue for democratic theory. Democratic 
theories not only enrich an understanding of the Supreme Court’s rationales, but 
also offer alternative forms of democracy from the liberal-democratic 
prescriptions of the Court. Lastly, a survey of the empirical political science 
research which has been done dealing with these questions in order to understand 
the implications of the Supreme Court’s decisions.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Government regulation of political contributions and expenditures is an issue which has received 
increased focus in the past five years in American politics. This is due in large part to 
controversial decisions on issues related to campaign finance legislation handed down by the 
Supreme Court of the United States. The public debate on campaign finance reform has centered 
on these decisions, particularity highlighting the Court’s role in deregulating the system in face 
of legislative attempts to limit both contributions to political campaigns as well as expenditures 
made by various political organizations during an election. Decisions such as Citizen’s United v. 
F.E.C. (2010) and the more recent McCutcheon v. F.E.C. (2014) have sparked popular interest in 
the news media and political discussions over the role of money in the American political 
system. Despite the quite recent interest in these issues however, these two decisions are merely 
the latest in a longstanding dialogue in Court opinions between two opposing viewpoints on the 
legitimacy and role of campaign finance regulation in the United States.  
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The research presented here attempts to bring together three separate, yet related perspectives on 
the question of campaign finance reform in the United States. Since much of the popular interest 
surrounding the issue is rooted in the recent Supreme Court cases, the first question dealt with is 
a judicial one. The question asks what sorts of debates and legal precedents have led the Court to 
a generally conservative stance on campaign finance reform. Court decisions are extensively 
analyzed in an attempt to answer this question. Stemming from the judicial question, a second 
research question is posed dealing with democratic theory. This perspective centers on 
longstanding debate in democratic theory as to the legitimacy of prioritizing freedom of political 
speech over political equality. The hope is that a theoretical perspective may supply a broader 
context with which to view the role of campaign finance in democracies. Finally, there is an 
empirical question of the effects of the Court’s decisions on American democracy. While there is 
a large debate about the effects of campaign donations and expenditures on electoral or 
legislative outcomes, the empirical section will be comprised of a literature review and as well as 
suggestions for future directions in empirical research.  
 
2. Survey of Supreme Court Cases 
 
The last forty years of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence in cases involving campaign finance 
regulation have exemplified a trend of deregulation, though the Court has never been unanimous 
in its position on such regulations. Since the decision in Buckley v. Valeo (1976) the Court has 
struggled between two opposing views of campaign finance reform. Generally speaking the 
Court has reacted to legislative attempts to reform the campaign finance system by striking down 
many regulations in such legislation. The Court’s monumental decision in Buckley to adopt an 
absolute view of the First Amendment rights at play, together with the narrow definition of 
corruption the Court used to justify any infringement of these rights has limited the discussion 
and possibilities for reform since. While there are exceptions to this deregulating trend in such 
decisions as Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990) and McConnell v. F.E.C. (2008), 
the majority on the Court have taken a conservative view of the constitutional and practical 
issues at hand, especially in the most recent decisions. The Court’s self-imposed restrictions laid 
out in Buckley have led to the monumental decisions in Citizens United and McCutcheon.  
 
Analysis of this trend through the Court’s opinions shows that the decisive issue at hand is 
whether or not government regulation of campaign expenditures or contributions is justifiable 
given the burden on First Amendment freedoms such regulations entail. Such burdens are viewed 
as the limitation of restricting the amount of political speech a person may spend money on, and 
the limitations of freedom of association by limiting how many campaigns an individual may 
contribute too as well as how much money a contribution may be. The more conservative judges 
ruling on these cases have stated that such encroachments on First Amendment freedoms are 
largely unjustifiable in constitutional terms, given the competing interests offered by the 
government: combating corruption, and “equalizing the playing field” of political participation 
and expression. In opposition to this view, the more liberal judges have countered that such 
regulations are justifiable given these legitimate governmental interests aimed at maintaining the 
integrity of the electoral process.  
 
Embedded in this larger issue of constitutionality is the more focused debate over whether or not 
powerful interests with a larger capacity to spend money on politics does or does not undermine 
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the integrity of the political process. Empirical answers to this are difficult to find, as the third 
section of this paper will explain. However, the Supreme Court has also delved into an important 
legal debate over what a proper legal definition of corruption is. In other words, the Court has 
asked what actually constitutes an undermining of the political process. To a large degree, the 
future of campaign finance in the United States hinges on the popular definition among justices. 
As the following summary of case history will show, the Court is largely divided on this issue.  
 
2.1 Buckley v. Valeo (1976)  
 
The Court’s divide between conservative and liberal points of view on the issue of campaign 
finance regulation began in 1976 with the case of Buckley v. Valeo. This case challenged large 
portions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 (F.E.C.A.) This legislation put in place 
broad restrictions on campaign contributions and expenditures, mandated disclosure of 
contributions and expenditures according to different types of political organizations, and 
established the Federal Election Commission to implement and monitor these regulations. Two 
aspects of how the majority in this ruling handled the case are important to understanding the 
differences between the two viewpoints. First, the majority rejected the government’s rationale 
that regulations were justified because they served to level the playing field of political influence 
within society by diminishing the capacity of large interests to spend far larger sums of money 
on political campaigns. Second, the Court made the important and lasting distinction between 
how campaign contributions and campaign expenditures were viewed in terms of constitutional 
protection.  
 
Rejection of the so called “equalization rationale” offered by the government suggests that the 
majority did not believe any such equalization would be necessary to uphold the integrity of the 
electoral process. When weighed against the protection of First Amendment freedoms the Court 
could not even view the case from an equalization perspective, stating “the concept that 
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the 
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment…” (Buckley v. Valeo, 1976).  
The Court did find that the government had a legitimate interest in regulating campaign finance 
in the name of guarding against the reality or appearance of quid pro quo corruption, however 
this is drastically different than the equalization rationale. The Buckley Court found that the only 
regulation necessary to uphold the integrity of the electoral process would be regulation of 
criminal bribery or its appearance. Outside of such blatant acts of corruption, the Court believed 
that the electoral process would function properly to represent the public, so long as first 
amendment freedoms were protected absolutely. Thus the Court established the precedent that 
government regulation of campaign finance may only seek to be justified in terms of combating 
the reality or appearance of quid pro quo corruption.  
 
From the perspective that only corruption could be targeted by regulation, the majority identified 
a difference between separate views for campaign contributions and campaign expenditures. 
Two distinguishing aspects of campaign contributions and expenditures led to differential 
treatment of these two types of regulations. First, contributions were seen as more susceptible to 
becoming quid pro quo corruption, since the contribution limits applied to the giving of money 
directly to a candidate for federal office or authorized campaign committees. Secondly, 
expenditures were viewed as more direct political speech, thus afforded more protection under 
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the First Amendment than contribution limitations. While contributions were viewed more as 
associational freedoms, the Court argued that the “expenditure ceilings impose direct and 
substantial restraints on the quantity of political speech.”  Here another precedent was set, 
namely that political expenditures must be afforded more protection under the First Amendment. 
This precedent opened an important door for interest group, eventually allowing them to 
organize and spend virtually unlimited sums of money with which to advocate directly for 
candidates and issues.  
 
The Court did keep in place many of the provisions of the FECA. Contribution limitations were 
upheld given their special role in preventing quid pro quo corruption. Much of the disclosure 
provisions along with the establishment of the F.E.C. to collect such disclosures remained law. 
Subsidizing of Presidential candidates’ campaigns by the Federal government given specific 
requirements was allowed. Nonetheless, for the reasons given above, the Court struck down 
expenditure limitations, the effects of which are felt in American electoral politics to this very 
day. Additionally, what the Court said in its opinion may be even more helpful than Buckley’s 
effect on legislation in understanding the Court’s role in shaping the Campaign Finance market.  
 
Rejection of the equalization rationale and the standard of combating quid pro quo corruption for 
justifying governmental regulation are perhaps the most important aspects of Buckley’s legacy on 
United States politics. It is clear that this legacy has framed the conversation between judiciaries, 
legislatures, and citizens about the legitimate role of campaign finance regulation in the United 
States. There has been substantial discussion in the opinions issued post-Buckley and onward 
questioning the legitimacy and relevancy of the precedent. In a number of cases between 1990 
and the present, the Court’s rulings have debated broadening the conception of corruption that 
Buckley established. During the same time period, the Court also debated the role of independent 
corporate expenditures in United States electoral politics, as well as the possibility for banning or 
regulating said expenditures.  
 
2.2 Possibilities for Broader Definitions of Corruption 
 
In the case of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990) the Court took a significant step 
away from Buckley’s handling of campaign expenditures. Dealing with Michigan campaign law, 
the Court upheld a provision which banned independent corporate expenditures on state and 
local races. Ultimately, the Court in Austin allowed regulation of a separate form of corruption 
than quid pro quo. This separate form of corruption can be defined as “the corrosive and 
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the 
corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s 
political ideas” (Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 1990). The appellants in the case, 
the Michigan Chamber of Commerce wished to make direct expenditures on local and state races 
within Michigan and wished to finance their endeavors using money from general funds rather 
than from an account set up specifically for such political expenditures, a point Michigan state 
law dictated. The majority in Austin saw direct expenditures from a corporations general funds as 
an example of “corporate form… that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the 
corporation’s political ideas.”  
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Given the broader definition of corruption allowed for in Austin, the Court let the Michigan law 
stand. While the definition employed in Austin was dictated by the fact that the funds in question 
were gathered through the corporate form, it still raised questions about the Buckley’s definition 
of corruption. Interests supported by large aggregations of wealth accumulated through the 
corporate form were seen as less representative of a public’s support for such interest’s political 
ideas. The door appeared to be opened for the Court to reconsider the implications of the quid 
pro quo definition of corruption outside of solely the realm of corporate expenditures.  
 
Discussion of reevaluating Buckley on the grounds of the legitimacy of the quid pro quo 
definition has been voiced by dissenting opinions since Austin. Even if the rejection of the 
“equalization rationale” established in Buckley is accepted, broadening the definition of 
corruption to include proposed negative effects that large aggregations of wealth may have on 
the electoral process could be a way to attack the same problems the equalization rationale seeks 
to rectify, though the Court’s views on expenditure limits may not be so easily dealt with by 
expending the definition of corruption. This is largely due to the majority’s rationale in Buckley 
that expenditure limits pose a more direct threat to political expression. The cases Randall v. 
Sorrell (2006) and McCutcheon v. F.E.C. demonstrate the dialogue between these opposing 
views of the definition of corruption.  
 
Randall v. Sorrell ruled on the constitutionality of Vermont campaign finance regulations. The 
important aspect of the Vermont statute in question was the exceptionally low limits that the 
state placed on both expenditures and contributions, indeed some of the lowest in United States 
history. Contribution limits were set at $200 to $400 dollars to candidates per election cycle. 
Expenditure limits were set at $300,000 dollars for gubernatorial candidates, and $2,000 dollars 
for candidates to the state legislature. In contrast to Federal statutes, individuals can contribute 
up to $2,100 dollars per congressional or presidential candidate, and since Buckley there are no 
expenditure limitations. The Court struck down the expenditure limitations, relying on Buckley’s 
precedent. As for the contribution limits, the majority eliminated them claiming that the 
limitations on contributions are not closely drawn enough to justify the First Amendment 
burdens they entail.  
 
The state offered an interest of combating the rising costs of elections as justification for its low 
limitations. While the dissent recognizes that this particular issue was not dealt with in Buckley, 
Justice Stevens claims that the Buckley precedent implies that such an interest would not be 
justified. It is conceivable that a broader definition of corruption could include the more general 
trend of unprecedented amounts of money being spent on all sorts of federal election campaigns, 
and Justice Stevens states in the dissent that, “I am convinced that Buckley’s holding on 
expenditure limits is wrong, and the time has come to overrule it” (Randall v. Sorrell, 2006). 
This statement shows the willingness of some of those on the Court to reevaluate Buckley’s 
definition of corruption to include those aspects of how campaigns are financed that could have a 
distorting effect on the electoral process outside of instances of quid pro quo corruption 
specifically.   
 
2.3 Recent Cases  
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The two most recent cases being studied were handed down in the last five years, and represent a 
dramatic shift towards even broader deregulation of the campaign finance system. Citizens 
United v. F.E.C. dealt with restrictions on independent corporate expenditures, similar to the 
issue at hand in Austin. The controversial decision struck down many of these restrictions, 
allowing independent corporate entities such as Super PAC’s to raise and spend unlimited sums 
of money on political campaign ads. So long as the outside interest does not coordinate with the 
campaign of the candidate they may be promoting, the majority did not find any reason they 
should view these corporate interests differently from individual’s protections under the First 
Amendment. McCutcheon v. F.E.C. dealt with aggregate contribution limits laid out in the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2003 (B.C.R.A.) The Court did not find that aggregate 
limits on the number of campaigns an individual may contribute to helped serve the government 
issue in preventing quid pro quo corruption, given the individual contribution limits in place.  
 
These two cases distinguish themselves from the preceding campaign finance jurisprudence in 
two important ways. First, these two cases have at least partly gone against precedent set in a 
number of cases since Buckley. In Citizens the Court struck down portions of the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act (2002) pertaining to independent corporate expenditures. These statutes 
were federal restrictions very similar to the Michigan state law upheld in Austin. McCutcheon 
overturned precedents pertaining to aggregate contribution limits dating back to Buckley as well 
as the case McCutcheon v. F.E.C. Secondly, both of these cases carry broad and distinctive 
implications for the campaign finance market. The decision in Citizens was extremely 
controversial, and a focus for the public debate surrounding campaign finance reform. This was 
due partly to the scope of the decision. Countless different groups were “freed” by the Citizens 
broad decision, in the sense that they could now raise and spend unlimited sums of money on 
political ads in federal election campaigns. McCutcheon’s decision struck down aggregate 
contribution limits, allowing wealthy individuals to contribute to as many federal candidates and 
political party committees as they wish. 
 
In the controversial decision handed down in Citizens United v. F.E.C. the Court overturned the 
precedent established by Austin in reference to bans on direct corporate expenditures by a 5-4 
vote along ideological lines. The majority viewed the proposed regulation of direct corporate 
expenditures as limiting First Amendment rights in terms of a speaker’s identity, and claims such 
restrictions are unconstitutional under the First Amendment. There is much debate between the 
majority and minority in Citizens United as to the legitimacy of this claim. The dissent 
recognizes, “Yet in a variety of contexts, we have held that speech can be regulated differentially 
on account of the speaker's identity, when identity is understood in categorical or institutional 
terms” (Citizens United v. F.E.C., 2010). The question of corporate identity was undoubtedly 
understood in such terms in the decision of Austin, and the Court believed speakers of a 
corporate identity posed more of a potential to unduly influence the electoral process.   
 
In McCutcheon v. F.EC. (2014), a case dealing with aggregate contribution limits laid out in the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (2002), the dissenting opinion cites a breed of corruption in 
which a few individuals gain undue influence over elected officials through large campaign 
contributions. This definition is obviously at odds with the majority’s quid pro quo definition of 
corruption in McCutcheon. Justice Breyer concluded in his dissent however, that a recognition of 
a subtler form of corruption is necessary to protect the legitimacy of the electoral process. This 
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form of corruption, it is argued, involves a breakdown of “the constitutionally necessary ‘chain 
of communication’ between the people and their representatives” (McCutcheon v. F.E.C., 2014).  
Acknowledgement of the risk of “undue influence”, a problem the majority denies to be 
defensible justification for regulation, is the relevant distinction between either sides of the 
debates in both McCutcheon and Randall over a definition of corruption.  
 
The rationales of the majority in both of these cases relied upon a strong view of the First 
Amendment, and a quid pro quo definition of corruption. Together these two views of the issue 
link the majority to a strong liberal-democratic tradition in democratic theory. This view of 
democracy values the protection of political rights such as freedom of speech and association as 
essential to facilitation of the democratic process. So long as everyone has the formal right to 
speak, the voice of the public will be heard. The decisions and precedents of the majority rely 
upon such liberal-democratic conceptions of democracy. Delving further into the democratic 
theories that the Court cases are based upon will help view the question of campaign finance 
legislation and the judicial debate associated with it in a broader context.  
 
3. Democratic Theory 
 
In the article entitled “Free Speech, Political Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform: A 
Paradox for Democracy?”, Tom De Luca poses the issue of campaign finance reform and the 
Supreme Court jurisprudence exemplifying this debate as an effort to negotiate a tension 
between democratic ideals of freedom of speech and political equality. “Democracy requires 
both speech free from governmental interference and government regulation of political 
resources- for the sake of democratic equity- including those necessary for political speech” (De 
Luca, 2007, p. 145). The debate over campaign finance reform epitomizes this fundamental 
“paradox” of democratic theory. Specifically, the question which divides those on the Court and 
those theorizing about democracy is which side of the paradox should constitutional priority be 
given? While some argue that absolute protection of the right to express political opinions is 
necessary for a fully functioning democracy, others argue that equal distribution of resources 
necessary for political speech must be mandated for the ideals of democracy to be fulfilled.  
 
3.1 Liberal-Democratic Position 
 
As the preceding analysis proves to show, some on the Court subscribe to a view of liberal-
democracy which calls for absolute protection of rights within a frame work of democratic 
institutions. These grounds are justified by arguments of the fundamental value of such human 
rights as freedom of conscience and the unregulated ability to voice one’s opinions. However, a 
second justification of absolute protection of First Amendment rights from the liberal-democratic 
perspective is one based on the democratic utility of such freedoms. In Buckely, the majority 
stated the First Amendment was designed “to secure the ‘widest possible dissemination of 
information of diverse and antagonistic sources’ and ‘to assure unfettered interchange of ideas 
for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people’” (Buckley v. Valeo, 
1976). From this view, the First Amendment facilitates government action in response to the 
wishes of the public.  
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These ideas were formerly laid out by such thinkers as J.S. Mill, who is considered the starting 
point for many modern liberal-democrats. Mill believed not only that the protection of rights was 
an important normative question, but also that protecting them would facilitate the work of a 
democracy. The best way to understand what the public wants is to guarantee the individual full 
right to voice their opinions. This sort of reasoning is at the heart of the conservative opinions on 
the Court when ruling on campaign finance legislation. Government cannot regulate the 
expression of political opinions through campaign expenditures and contributions, unless 
blatantly criminal acts are discovered which could potentially ruin the integrity of the democratic 
process. The only permissible example of such corruption is quid pro quo, the most drastic and 
literal form of corruption which could be observed. Anything short of this, they fear, is not only 
contrary to the ideals embedded in the Bill of Rights, but also would hinder the democratic 
process at large  
 
There are sound theoretical reasons to believe that protecting such First Amendment rights does 
help achieve the goal of democratic forms of government, which is people exercising power over 
themselves and at their discretion. Government must not regulate the expression of people’s 
political opinions, it is argued, because of the legitimate threat that a government granted such 
power could use it to systematically regulate opposition opinions to the ruling party, or 
overemphasize the popularity of certain opinions held by the public. But there are also 
theoretical problems associated with unregulated political speech within the liberal-democratic 
tradition itself.  
 
One reason that Mill and other liberal-democrats believe that the freedom of opinion and 
conscience must be protected absolutely is because, generally speaking, one’s personal opinions 
and beliefs pose little if any risk to negatively affecting or harming others in society. Indeed, a 
central tenet of liberal-democratic thought is that the only justification for government intrusion 
on personal freedoms is to protect others in society who may be harmed by another individual 
exercising their freedoms. But as both sides of the debate on the Court have acknowledged, there 
is significant differences between speech made between individuals in private, and political 
speech made in the public sphere. The question then becomes, for both the Court and democratic 
theory, is there anything about the utility of political speech which may dictate a separate 
treatment from other forms of expression? 
 
Noted liberal-democratic thinker John Rawls discusses many of the issues associated with 
weighing free political speech against equal political speech voiced by the dissenting opinions in 
the more recent cases. Rawls draws an important distinction between formally equal basic 
liberties, such as the formal protection of certain rights by a constitution, and basic liberties 
which have equal value for those exercising them. He goes on to argue that in the case of the 
basic right of political speech, they must be guaranteed equal value, primarily because all other 
rights depend on one’s ability to influence government. Rawls deals specifically with the 
equalization rationale offered in Buckley as an attempt by the government to guarantee fair value 
(1993, p. 360) an attempt the Court did not endorse at large. However, the dissent in recent cases 
is closely aligned to the sorts of views Rawls holds. As De Luca asks, if the Court believes that 
the First Amendment is aimed at achieving political and social change, how could the liberal-
democrat view on the Court “depreciate so easily the equalization goal, given the empirical 
realities of social and economic inequality in political participation?” (2007, p.149). It is 
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precisely these sorts of inequalities which Rawls and the dissent would argue must be taken into 
account to guarantee the equal value of political liberties, and for a liberal-democracy to function 
properly.  
 
The practical logic of the liberal-democrat standpoint emphasizing the need for protecting rights 
is reminiscent of the McCutcheon dissent’s idea of a “constitutionally necessary ‘chain of 
communication’ between the people and their representatives (2014).” Again, the dissent argued 
in McCutcheon that allowing those wealthier individuals within in society unregulated 
opportunities to affect the results of elections results in a specific form of corruption. The chain 
of communication is distorted by this practice, or in the dissent’s words there is a “breakdown”. 
Preventing such distortions of the democratic process was surely the aim of Rawls’ provision for 
political rights being of equal value. For both the dissent and Rawls, the utility of First 
Amendment rights does not simply rest in their mere absolute protection. These rights only 
ensure the democratic process if they are equally enough distributed among citizens such that 
their being exercised has an equal likelihood of affecting government action for each citizen or 
group of citizens. An acceptable model of liberal-democracy, from these perspectives, may 
actually require more than simply the protection of First Amendment rights.  
 
3.2 Challenges to Liberal-Democratic Position 
 
Much of the world of democratic theory is positioned to address problems associated with 
liberal-democracy. Not surprisingly, most of these opposing theories deal with lifting some 
emphasis in theory from the liberal component and placing it instead on the democratic 
component of liberal-democracy. The value of democracy, many theorists argue, rests not in its 
ability to protect some sort of fundamental human rights, but rather in the functioning of the 
democratic process itself and the interactions it generates between members of society. Two 
prominent theories focused on the value of the democratic process itself for a society are 
participatory and deliberative democracy.  
 
Examples of liberal-democratic theory often view the democratic process as simply the means 
through which the public picks its representatives. The acts of governing and actual policy 
decision making is reserved for those representatives so chosen, and direct influence over the 
making of those decisions typically left to those involved in organized interest groups. 
Participatory democrats view this definition of the democratic process as far too narrow. They 
emphasize the importance of utilizing direct citizen participation in decision making where ever 
possible. Generally beginning in localized arenas such as neighborhoods and city governments, 
participatory theorists believe direct decision making not only exemplifies the abstract ideals of 
democracy, but provides an even more pure representation of the public’s interests than simply 
safe-guarding formal political rights.  
 
They argue further that the process of participating in direct democratic decision making helps 
develop a collective awareness and solidarity among the people within a society, harkening to 
forms of civic republicanism premised on the same ideas of community action. Another 
interesting feature of such theories is that the coercive powers of government usually placed in 
an executive are purely administrative in an ideal participatory system. Authorities draw their 
power directly from the will of the people and their decisions of where common public interests 
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lie. In terms of campaign finance debates, it is easy to see that those endorsing participatory 
democracy would view the subtle form of corruption alluded to by the recent dissenting opinions 
on the Court as self-imposed difficulties for liberal-democracy and its preference for voting and 
representation.  
 
Deliberative democratic theory views a democratic system as legitimate to the extent that it 
promotes public deliberation on particular political issues as well as the very rules and 
institutions which facilitate deliberation. While many liberal-democrats view the democratic 
system as one which aggregates citizens fixed preferences and desires, deliberative theorists 
believe that a more realistic view of individuals in the democratic game understands individuals’ 
preferences to not be fixed. In fact, many such theorists believe that deliberation should actually 
lead to a collectively realized consensus of the common good. Liberal-democrats such as Rawls 
have rejected such a normative conception of the role of the democratic process for fear that 
governments may seek to indoctrinate specific values into a society.  
 
Many deliberative theorists disagree about what sorts of conceptions of a common good may 
arise from a democratic deliberation, or even what sorts of conceptions may be normatively 
appropriate. They do nonetheless agree that a sincere democratic system should seek to 
legitimate political institutions by encouraging citizens to seek a consensus, rather than offering 
alternative arguments from a fixed preferences perspective. In cases such as Buckley and Citizens 
United the majority uses a liberal conception of democracy to protect an individual’s right to 
freely express their political views. Deliberative theorists would find fault in the decisions of the 
Court in that they do not go far enough to encourage people to come to any sort of consensus, the 
most valuable aspect of democracy for such theorists.  
 
Perhaps the most important problem for liberal-democracy in reference to the tension between 
political liberties such as free speech and political equality is the charge that liberal democracy 
masks oppression. Democratic theorists who favor a liberal component to democracy tend to 
prescribe certain formal institutions and procedures to ensure specified liberties, such as freedom 
of speech. According to Cunningham (2002, p. 71) the primary problem with these formal 
institutions, and the liberal democracies which enshrine them, is that they block efforts to reverse 
systematic oppression by limiting the scope of what is appropriate for government regulation to a 
narrow public realm. Similar to the way Rawls sought to ensure equal value of political liberties, 
the dissenters on the Court may favor an equalization rationale for regulating campaign finance. 
But, as the majority has concluded in numerous cases, the formal restrictions on government 
intervention outlined in the Constitution and interpreted in precedents laid out by the Court 
largely rule out the option of seeking strictly equalization in campaign finance law.  
 
4. Empirical Study  
 
It is difficult to pin point the differences in campaign finance before and after the issuing of the 
more recent decisions. One reason for this is that there simply hasn’t been enough time for 
serious changes in the ways that politicians and other groups raise or spend money to manifest 
themselves. Another reason is that it is difficult to empirically understand how a Court decision 
will affect the incentives and behaviors of certain actors. In other words, it is difficult to prove 
that the rise in outside spending on political campaigns has occurred because of the Citizens 
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United decision was issued. Nonetheless, there is a considerable amount of literature dealing 
with how both contributions and expenditures affect both electoral and legislative outcomes.  
 
4.1 Literature Review 
 
The review is organized according to discussion of the empirical issues relevant to the decisions 
in Citizens United and McCutcheon. First, research is reviewed which deals with the effects of 
expenditure bans for corporations and labor unions on election outcomes. There is no argument 
that outside spending on federal elections has increased dramatically since 2010. However, it is 
vital to understanding the importance of Citizens United to figure out if these groups’ large 
spending is actually leading to their own favorable electoral outcomes. Multiple theories have 
been developed to explain where corporations may be expected to have the greatest impact on 
electoral outcomes. Brunell (2005) claims that corporate and labor interests have reasons to favor 
a specific party’s expected legislation, and thus often contribute where it may be put to the best 
use for a specific political party. A second strand of research suggests that these sorts of groups 
are more likely to contribute to incumbents, rather than challengers, in order to gain access to 
candidates likely to remain in office.  
 
Given these considerations, corporations and labor unions post-Citizens United would be 
expected to spend large amounts of money on specific candidates depending on the political 
party or electoral prospects. However, it is not clear whether or not corporate and labor union 
expenditures result in electoral success for the candidates they prefer. The past research studying 
campaign spending and election outcomes concluded that that increasingly high levels of 
campaign spending has a diminishing return in terms of electoral success (Levitt, 1994; La Raja 
& Schaffner, 2014). If the type of expenditures in question in Citizens United do affect electoral 
outcomes, it would be possible to see the differences when comparing electoral systems that 
work with corporate expenditure bans and those that do not. La Raja & Schaffner (2014) applied 
this sort of analysis to state elections, comparing elections in different states over time that had 
expenditure bans to those that did not. They concluded from this analysis that expenditure bans 
appear to have limited effects on electoral outcomes in states (La Raja & Schaffner, 2014).  
 
If it is true, as much of this research suggests, that campaign spending has little effect on 
elections, then there may be support for the narrower definition of corruption. Since election 
spending does not affect election outcomes in a substantial way, the First Amendment rights in 
question must prevail over the governments’ meaningless restrictions. Though there is still 
evidence supporting some of the dissents claims that a broader definition of corruption is 
justified given the distorting effects of money. Powell (2013) draws from analysis of every state 
legislative chamber in the United States, and determined that differing institutional design and 
political realities lead to differing levels of influence contributions may have on policy choices. 
Ambitions of some members for higher office, salaries paid to legislators, and size of 
constituencies were a few of the factors that determined the level of influence political 
contributions have on legislative policy. This research bears specific relevance to understanding 
the effects of the McCutcheon decision. As wealthy donors are allowed to donate to as many 
candidates, they have an increased pool of policy makers they may influence.  
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4.2 Future Directions  
 
Coupled with the preceding considerations from Court case analysis and democratic theory, the 
most interesting direction for future research the empirical literature brings out is understanding 
the ramifications of the McCutcheon decision on future elections and legislators. The cases of 
institutional and political conditions in which contributions had the greatest chance of 
influencing legislative policy in Powell (2013) may not be conclusive. Furthermore, while many 
researchers focus on state elections and legislatures for purposes of comparison, there is not 
similar research dealing with contributions and influence at the federal level. The door has been 
opened for groups known as joint fundraising committees (JFC’s) to raise exceptionally large 
contributions from wealthy individuals following the McCutcheon decision. 
 
JFC’s are organizations of federal and state candidates and party committees, which raise 
donations together and distribute the funds amongst the participants in the JFC. Following 
McCutcheon, these organizations may open new doors for individuals and corporate entities to 
contribute to as many campaigns as they wish. JFC’s may become tools which facilitate large 
scale political contributions directly to numerous candidates and party committees. 
Understanding their developing role in future elections may shed another light on the Court’s 
decision to strike down the aggregate contribution limits.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
It is clear from the analysis of the Court’s decisions and dialogue through the recent case history 
dealing with campaign finance that there is no consensus among justices as to how to interpret 
the issue of campaign finance reform. Nonetheless, there is no question that the aggregate of 
their views represented by the votes on each of the decisions has exemplified a trend towards 
deregulation. On the question of constitutionality of regulation attempts, the Court has claimed 
that they must be weighed against the most robust of First Amendment political rights. Given 
this consideration, the Court has established the quid pro quo definition of corruption as being 
the only form justifiably regulated by the government. This move is controversial not only in the 
public at large, but among those on the Court as well. Future prospects for campaign finance 
reform, in terms of expected Court challenges, appear dismal. Short of a constitutional 
amendment, some scholars and activists such as Lawrence Lessig have suggested that the only 
way to confront this issue outside of the Courts is through a change in American political culture 
and the incentives of candidates running for office. But incumbent advantage and vested interests 
in federal elections pose problems for this avenue as well. However, the judicial question must 
not be disregarded. The Court has a serious and real effect on the system of campaign finance in 
the United States, and their decisions may yet view the issues in a different light. Overruling 
precedents set out in Buckley may be a bold expectation of the current Supreme Court, but 
broader definitions of corruption may allow the Court to make serious changes to the campaign 
finance system nonetheless.  
 
Such a solution may be easily endorsed by participatory democrats from a theoretical 
perspective. The Court’s position of absolute First Amendment freedoms exemplifies a strong 
liberal-democratic view of campaign finance. The dissent is far from holding theoretical 
perspectives similar to participatory or deliberative theory, partly due to their dependence on the 
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Constitution and precedent for legal reasoning. Rawls’ notion of fair value of political liberties 
however does seem to be extremely similar to the dissent’s arguments for an equalization 
rationale or a broader definition of corruption. This makes sense given the fact that Rawls’ 
argues from within the liberal-democratic framework, as the dissent is forced to do as well. 
There is no question that these opposing views of democracy do hold some weight in discussions 
of campaign finance reform. Particularly, these perspectives can help attain an understanding of 
what should be valued in American democracy. The tension between free speech and political 
equality is exemplified by these theories outside the realm of American political discussion, and 
it is essential to properly viewing the issue of campaign finance to take these theories into 
account.  
 
Regardless of the theoretical justifications for the Supreme Court’s decisions, there is also an 
important question of empirically observable trends and effects of deregulated democracy on the 
electoral process. Specifically, these questions of the influence political spending has on electoral 
or legislative outcomes is important to framing arguments for a broader definition of corruption. 
However, there does not seem to be a substantial consensus on the effects of campaign donations 
or expenditures in the outcomes of the political process. It does appear to be true that increased 
spending does not make a difference after a certain amount has been spent on the campaign, 
giving some weight to the arguments made by the majority in cases like Citizens United. 
However, evidence of contributors’ influence over elected officials under certain conditions in 
state legislators has not been applied directly to the United States legislative bodies, and such an 
analysis may offer empirical support to a broader definition of corruption.  
 
Popular discussion of the issue of campaign finance reform typically paints the Supreme Court as 
a political actor overstepping its bounds and substantially ruining the integrity of the electoral 
process. This paper attempts to show the inherent complexity in the Court’s decisions on 
campaign finance reform, and indeed the complexity of the issue of campaign finance in general 
for democracy. Beginning with the legal question of the Supreme Court’s own rationale and 
precedents, it is easy to see that the Court’s decisions rely on both theoretical conceptions of 
democracy and some sort of intuition about how politics works in the real world. From the 
perspective of political science, it may be more fruitful to understand the empirical nature of 
influence in the newly deregulated campaign finance market. Thus far, the research has been 
inconclusive giving justification to many arguments as to the constitutional priority of protecting 
First Amendment rights over a risk of corruption which has not been proven. With the handing 
down of the McCutcheon decision and new avenues for political contributors to affect elections, 
new research avenues are also opened up which may shed more light on this issue over time.  
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